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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Under Florida law the phrase “public purpose” carries with it sev-
eral different meanings, and when used as a standard for determin-
ing the limits of governmental actions it offers differing levels of pro-
tection for the property and money of private individuals. This Note 
will examine significant decisions and underlying policy considera-
tions in three areas of Florida law that rely heavily on a finding of a 
public purpose: (1) validation of revenue bonds, (2) ad valorem tax 
exemptions, and (3) eminent domain. 
 Several common threads bind these areas of law. First, in each 
context, the governmental actions and resultant legal actions have 
the potential of substantially impacting the property and wealth of 
any person residing in the State of Florida. Second, the law applica-
ble to each has been, over time, substantially influenced by a judicial 
gloss on the constitutional provisions which form their foundations. 
Third, the introduction of a resultant benefit flowing to private enti-
ties raises challenges to the validity of the governmental action, in 
many cases; well-founded challenges. Finally, in all three contexts, 
the ability of a governmental unit to go forward with its contem-
plated course of action rests upon a judicial determination that the 
action will serve a public purpose to one degree or another. 
 The survey of the law undertaken in this Note will highlight the 
inconsistency and confusion that results from the Florida courts’ in-
sistence on treating “public purpose” as something slightly different 
in each context. Perhaps the time has come to reconcile the judicial 
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meaning of “public purpose” with the meaning understood and ex-
pected by the layperson reading his state’s constitution and that any 
of that document’s infirmities are the people’s to remedy, not the 
courts’ or the legislature’s. 
II.   REVENUE BOND ISSUES AND PUBLIC PURPOSE 
 According to the Florida Supreme Court, sun and sand are not 
enough to ensure the state’s prosperity.1 Because this is so, commu-
nities have gone to great lengths to increase their attractiveness to 
tourists and industry.2 Common methods have included the develop-
ment of recreational facilities and attempts to lure or retain profes-
sional sports teams through the issuance of revenue bonds.3 The dif-
ficulty that arises in these cases is that a community pursuing such a 
venture is frequently not the sole beneficiary of the development. Of-
tentimes, as in the case of attracting a professional sports franchise, 
private parties receive significant benefits at the expense of a com-
munity’s taxpayers.4  
A.   Paramount Public Purpose and Incidental Private Benefits 
 In Poe v. Hillsborough County, the new owner of the Tampa Bay 
Buccaneers threatened relocation claiming that his team could not 
compete with other franchises in the league absent increased reve-
nue generating options.5 These options, such as luxury suites and 
club seating, required the construction of a new stadium.6 Fearing 
the Buccaneers’ imminent departure, notwithstanding the fact that 
the owner had not applied to the league for relocation approval, the 
local government7 scrambled to reach an agreement for the construc-
tion of a new stadium and to devise a method of financing the sta-
dium.8  
                                                                                                                    
 1. Poe v. Hillsborough County, 695 So. 2d 672, 676 (Fla. 1997) (quoting State v. Day-
tona Beach Racing & Recreational Dev. Facilities Dist., 89 So. 2d 34, 37 (Fla. 1956)). 
 2. See id. 
 3. See generally id. (football stadium); see also Roper v. City of Clearwater, 796 So. 
2d 1159 (Fla. 2001) (Major League Baseball spring training facility); State v. Osceola 
County, 752 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1999) (convention center); Orange County Indus. Dev. Auth. 
v. State, 427 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 1983) (television station); State v. Osceola County Indus. Dev. 
Auth., 424 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1982) (public lodging facility); Daytona Beach Racing & Recrea-
tional Dev. Facilities Dist., 89 So. 2d 34 (motor speedway).  
 4. See Poe, 695 So. 2d at 674 (one-half cent sales surtax imposed to finance construc-
tion of community stadium made available to pro football team owner under very favorable 
terms). 
 5. Id. at 673. 
 6. Id.  
 7. Local government in this case included the cities of Tampa, Temple Terrace, and 
Plant City, Hillsborough County, and the Tampa Sports Authority. See id. at 674. 
 8. Id. at 673-74. In the space of less than one year, negotiations with the new owner 
began and ended, a thirty-year one-half cent infrastructure surtax was enacted, the voters 
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 In the end, a one-half cent sales surtax was imposed on the resi-
dents of Hillsborough County through an ordinance and subsequent 
referendum approval.9 While much of the revenue generated from the 
surtax was to be devoted to schools and general municipal uses, the 
portion that was devoted to stadium construction was significant—
$318 million.10 As part of the thirty-year agreement with the owner 
of the Buccaneers, the Tampa Sports Authority (TSA) retained own-
ership of the stadium. Additionally, the TSA would receive $3.5 mil-
lion dollars in fees and $1.93 million in ticket surcharges each year 
from the Buccaneers for a total of $162 million.11 The $156 million 
gap between the cost of the stadium and the amount paid by the 
Buccaneers by itself may well have been enough to raise the ire of 
the forty-seven percent of Hillsborough County voters who voted 
against the surtax. However, the agreement provided another sig-
nificant benefit for the Buccaneers. In addition to the revenues gen-
erated by the Buccaneers games, the agreement entitled the team to 
the first $2 million generated from non-Buccaneers events held at 
the stadium.12 Needless to say, the payment bore a striking resem-
blance to the payment of rent by the landlord, TSA, to the tenant, the 
Buccaneers, and represented the sole reason for the trial court’s re-
fusal to validate a bond issue with which the TSA and the City of 
Tampa sought to begin construction.13 
 Article VII, Section 10 of the Florida Constitution provides that 
“[n]either the state nor any county, school district, municipality, spe-
cial district, or agency of any of them, shall . . . lend or use its taxing 
power or credit to aid any corporation, association, partnership or 
person.”14 That section further provides that the state is not prohib-
ited from issuing bonds to finance infrastructure projects such as 
airports or ports or industrial facilities.15 However, a literal reading 
                                                                                                                    
approved the surtax by referendum (53%), and a suit was filed challenging the validity of 
the arrangement. Id.  
 9. Id. at 674. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 675. 
 14. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 10. 
 15. The complete text of section 10 provides: 
Neither the state nor any county, school district, municipality, special district, 
or agency of any of them, shall become a joint owner with, or stockholder of, or 
give, lend or use its taxing power or credit to aid any corporation, association, 
partnership or person; but this shall not prohibit laws authorizing: 
 (a) the investment of public trust funds; 
 (b) the investment of other public funds in obligations of, or insured by, the 
United States or any of its instrumentalities; 
 (c) the issuance and sale by any county, municipality, special district or other 
local governmental body of (1) revenue bonds to finance or refinance the cost of 
capital projects for airports or port facilities, or (2) revenue bonds to finance or 
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of the language fails to reveal an exception where a municipality may 
issue revenue bonds to construct a sports stadium directly and sub-
stantially benefiting a private entity. Nevertheless, the law in Flor-
ida has long been that a bond issue is constitutional as long as the is-
suer “has the authority to issue [the] bonds; . . . the purpose of the 
obligation is legal; and . . . the bond issuance complies with the re-
quirements of the law.”16 In the case of recreational facilities revenue 
bonds, a legal purpose has been defined as one where the project 
serves a “paramount public purpose.”17  
 The origin of the “public purpose doctrine,” as it relates to sports 
venues, finds its roots in State v. Daytona Beach Racing & Recrea-
tional Development Facilities District.18 In that case the court con-
cluded that the issuance of bonds for the purpose of financing the 
construction of the Daytona Motor Speedway did not violate article 
IX, section 10 (article VII, section 10’s predecessor).19 In rejecting the 
constitutional challenge to the bond issue, the court stated: 
Appellant’s final argument is that to lease the facility for a part of 
each year to a private corporation constitutes a violation of Section 
10 of Article IX of the Constitution of Florida, F.S.A., which pro-
hibits the loaning of the District’s credit to any corporation. It con-
tends that the effect of the contemplated contract with the Corpo-
ration is to allow it to use the facility for part of each year for forty 
years with no capital investment and consequently the credit of the 
District is loaned to the Corporation. But we have heretofore held 
that if an undertaking is for public purposes, Article IX, § 10 of the 
Constitution is not violated even though some private parties may 
be incidentally benefited . . . . “The mere fact that some one en-
gaged in private business for private gain will be benefited by 
every public improvement undertaken by the government or a gov-
                                                                                                                    
refinance the cost of capital projects for industrial or manufacturing plants to 
the extent that the interest thereon is exempt from income taxes under the 
then existing laws of the United States, when, in either case, the revenue bonds 
are payable solely from revenue derived from the sale, operation or leasing of 
the projects. If any project so financed, or any part thereof, is occupied or oper-
ated by any private corporation, association, partnership or person pursuant to 
contract or lease with the issuing body, the property interest created by such 
contract or lease shall be subject to taxation to the same extent as other pri-
vately owned property. 
 (d) a municipality, county, special district, or agency of any of them, being a 
joint owner of, giving, or lending or using its taxing power or credit for the joint 
ownership, construction and operation of electrical energy generating or 
transmission facilities with any corporation, association, partnership or person. 
Id. 
 16. Sebring Airport Auth. v. McIntyre, 783 So. 2d 238, 249 (Fla. 2001) (Sebring IV) 
(quoting State v. Osceola County, 752 So. 2d 530, 533 (Fla. 1999); Poe, 695 So. 2d at 675.  
 17. Poe, 695 So. 2d at 675.  
 18. 89 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1956). 
 19. Id. at 37 (interpreting FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. IX, §10 (amended in 1968 to be-
come FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 10)). 
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ernmental agency, should not and does not deprive such improve-
ment of its public character or detract from the fact that it primar-
ily serves a public purpose. An incidental use or benefit which may 
be of some private benefit is not the proper test in determining 
whether or not the project is for a public purpose.”20 
 Over the years, the rule of the Daytona Beach case has been re-
fined to hold that a “bond issue does not violate article VII, section 10 
so long as the project serves a ‘paramount public purpose,’ and any 
benefits to private parties from the project are incidental.”21 In Poe, 
the trial court stated that the construction would serve a paramount 
public purpose but found that the inclusion of the clause allocating 
non-Buccaneers event revenue to the team rendered the purpose of 
the project predominately private.22 The trial court suggested that 
the elimination of that clause would clear the way for validation.23 
The supreme court disagreed with the trial court’s characterization 
of the purpose of the project. 
 Citing to testimony credited by the trial court regarding the eco-
nomic benefits of the new stadium, the supreme court held that once 
it is determined that a paramount public purpose exists, “the court 
cannot micromanage the arms-length business negotiations of the 
parties by striking discrete portions of a complex arrangement which, 
as a whole, the court candidly finds to be substantially beneficial to 
the public.”24 TSA’s expert witness concluded that the economic bene-
fit to the community would far exceed the cost of the new stadium.25 
This supported the finding of a paramount public purpose. The su-
preme court did not disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that the 
Buccaneers’ owner “got ‘too sweet’ a deal.”26 Nevertheless, the court 
determined the trial court’s finding of paramount public purpose was 
controlling and remanded the case with instructions to validate the 
bond issue.27  
 The Poe decision raises two interesting questions. First, is it le-
gitimate to force the financing of recreational and entertainment fa-
cilities within the scope of permissible acts under article VII, section 
10 of the Florida Constitution? And second, what are the bounds of 
                                                                                                                    
 20. Id. at 37-38 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Bd. of Control, 66 So. 2d 209, 210 
(Fla. 1953)). 
 21. See Poe, 695 So. 2d at 675 (citing N. Palm Beach County Water Control Dist. v. 
State, 604 So. 2d 440, 441-42 (Fla. 1992); Wald v. Sarasota County Health Facilities Auth., 
360 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 1978); State v. Jacksonville Port Auth., 204 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1967)). 
 22. Poe, 695 So. 2d at 675. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 679. 
 25. Id. at 678. 
 26. Id. at 678-79. 
 27. Id. at 679. 
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paramount public purpose? The Poe court, for the most part, left 
these questions unanswered. 
B.   The Expansive Construction of Article VII, Section 10 
 As noted above, article VII, section 10 of the Florida Constitution 
specifically provides that an arm of the state may lend its taxing 
power or credit for the benefit of private entities by issuing revenue 
bonds for the purpose of financing airports or port facilities.28 Intui-
tively, this makes sense. Airports and ports are significant forms of 
infrastructure that offer immediate and substantial benefits to a 
community. Depending upon the size and geographic location of a 
community, development of these facilities may well be considered as 
important to local commerce and quality of life as police, fire protec-
tion, and a well maintained system of roads and streets. However, 
article VII, section 10 says nothing about football stadiums and mo-
tor speedways. Yet, Florida courts have interpreted this provision as 
including these types of projects within its exceptions.29 
 In Nohrr v. Brevard County Educational Facilities Authority, the 
supreme court explained that the type of projects that may be fi-
nanced under the exceptions to the article VII, section 10 proscrip-
tions against private benefits were not limited to those enumerated.30 
In Nohrr, bonds were issued to finance the construction of a dormi-
tory and cafeteria at a private university and the resulting debt was 
to be serviced from rents and other sources of revenue derived from 
the project itself.31 The court noted that public financing of projects 
resulting in benefits to private entities had been a source of dispute 
dating back to the adoption of article IX, section 10 of the Florida 
Constitution of 1885, the predecessor to article VII, section 10, which 
was adopted in 1968.32 The 1885 provision listed no exceptions to the 
pledging of credit by an arm of the state benefiting a private entity.33 
However, under the earlier provision, courts had held that the issu-
ance of bonds to finance projects incidentally benefiting private par-
ties did not amount to pledging the state’s credit if the public was 
neither “directly [nor] contingently liable to pay something to some-
body.”34 Over time, the paramount public purpose/incidental private 
                                                                                                                    
 28. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 10. 
 29. See, e.g., Orange County Indus. Dev. Auth. v. State, 427 So. 2d 174, 178 (Fla. 
1983) (“This Court has recognized that the listing of particular authorized projects . . . was 
not intended to deny public revenue bond financing of other types of projects.”); Nohrr v. 
Brevard County Educ. Facilities Auth., 247 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1971). 
 30. Nohrr, 247 So. 2d at 308-09. 
 31. Id. at 306. 
 32. Id. at 309. 
 33. Id.; see also FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. IX, § 10. 
 34. Nohrr, 247 So. 2d at 309. 
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purpose test evolved for these situations.35 The Nohrr court deter-
mined that the addition of specific exceptions in the Florida Consti-
tution of 1968 was not meant to exclude all other types of projects.36 
Rather, the financing of projects such as airports and ports “was rec-
ognized by the Constitution itself as not constituting the lending or 
use of public credit.”37 The court ultimately held that the bond issue 
was constitutional under article VII, section 10, finding that:  
Neither the full faith and credit nor the taxing power of the State 
of Florida or of any political subdivision thereof is pledged to the 
payment of the principal of, or the interest on, these revenue 
bonds. The purchasers of the revenue bonds may not look to any 
legal or moral obligation on the part of the state, county, or author-
ity to pay any portion of the bonds.38 
 The principal distinction between the Nohrr and Daytona Beach 
cases, and Poe, is the source of the funds used to pay the principal 
and interest on the bonds. In Poe, the court in one short sentence re-
jected “Poe’s contention that even when a project serves a paramount 
public purpose that only bonds which are to be repaid from revenues 
derived from the project itself may be validated if a private entity 
also derives some benefit from the project.”39 In Nohrr and Daytona 
Beach, on the other hand, the bonds were to be repaid from revenues 
derived from their respective projects.40 
 The cases cited by the Poe court in rejecting the argument that 
the bonds should be repaid from the project’s revenues bore little re-
semblance to the matter before the court. In State v. Miami, the pur-
pose of the challenged bond issue was the construction of a conven-
tion center and garage.41 The challenge arose out of the fact that 
nearly ten years after the bonds were sold, the city entered into de-
velopment agreements, which provided certain benefits to the Uni-
versity of Miami and a developer in exchange for an agreement to en-
ter into long-term leases with the city.42 The means of repaying the 
                                                                                                                    
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 308. 
 37. Id. (discussing FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 10). 
 38. Id. at 309. 
 39. Poe v. Hillsborough County, 695 So. 2d 672, 679 (Fla. 1997) (citing State v. City of 
Miami, 379 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 1980); State v. Sunrise Lakes Phase II Special Recreation 
Dist., 383 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1980); Panama City v. State, 93 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1957)).  
 40. See Nohrr, 247 So. 2d at 307 (“All expenses are required to be borne by the educa-
tional institution involved and no other source of payment, which might otherwise be 
available for the public generally, is to be used in any manner whatsoever in connection 
with the project.”); State v. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Dev. Facilities Dist., 89 
So. 2d 34, 35 (Fla. 1956) (The bonds were “payable solely from revenues derived from the 
facility”). 
 41. State v. Miami, 379 So. 2d 651, 652 (Fla. 1980). 
 42. Id. at 652. 
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bonds was not directly addressed.43 However, the court determined 
that the convention center had been contemplated long before any 
agreement with the private entities had occurred, and it was “clear 
that the City’s dominant interest had continually been the construc-
tion of the convention center-garage, and the lease of property by the 
City is only incidental to the paramount public purpose.”44 The same 
cannot be said of Poe, where the complaint to validate the bond is-
sues was filed less than three months after the agreement with the 
team owner.45  
 The second case in the Poe court’s string cite offered little more 
justification for the short shrift given to Mr. Poe’s source of repay-
ment argument.46 In State v. Sunrise Lakes Phase II Special Recrea-
tion District, the special recreation district sought the validation of 
bonds for the purpose of purchasing property from a condominium 
association and developing recreational facilities thereon.47 The chal-
lengers asserted that a public purpose was lacking because of the 
proximity of the facilities to the condominium complex.48 The court 
noted that the purpose of a recreational district was to provide and 
improve recreational facilities within a limited geographical area and 
that it was inevitable that any chosen property would be more con-
venient to some than others.49 The court affirmed the bond validation 
and the trial court’s finding of public purpose stating that the “key is 
the availability of the facilities to the general public. Without that 
availability, there is no public purpose.”50  
 Sunrise Lakes, unlike Poe, clearly demonstrates the nature of an 
incidental private benefit. Regardless of the chosen location for the 
development of recreational facilities, some members of the commu-
nity will benefit more than others; it cannot be avoided. However, 
unlike the football stadium in Poe, all members of the public will 
have equal rights to use and enjoy the facility. It is much the same as 
if a municipality purchases land from a private individual for use as 
a public park. Before the sale, the landowner was free to use and en-
joy the land. After the sale, the landowner is free to use and enjoy the 
land along with the other members of the public. Other than to illus-
                                                                                                                    
 43. See id. The convention center bonds “were secured by a pledge of the net revenues 
derived by the City from or in connection with the convention center-garage and other 
revenues of the City exclusive of ad valorem tax revenues.” Id. at 652. The series of bond 
issues contemplated in Poe were secured exclusively by tax revenues. Poe, 695 So. 2d at 
675. 
 44. Miami, 379 So. 2d at 653. 
 45. Poe, 695 So. 2d at 675. 
 46. State v. Sunrise Lakes Phase II Special Recreation Dist., 383 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 
1980). 
 47. Id. at 632. 
 48. Id. at 633. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
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trate the wide range of private benefits deemed incidental, it is hard 
to see the relevance of this kind of case to Poe.  
 State v. Panama City, the final case cited by the court to counter 
the assertion that bonds must be paid from the financed project’s 
revenues, serves as another illustration of a purely incidental private 
benefit.51 The challengers to the bond validation in that case claimed 
that the underlying project had lost its public purpose because the 
city intended to construct retail shops and lease them to private enti-
ties as part of the development of a city marina.52 The rent revenues 
from these shops were estimated to account for 20% of the total reve-
nues derived from the project, and the shops would occupy only 
1.22% of the total project area.53 While the opinion briefly discussed 
the source of payment on the bonds in question, the court focused on 
the incidental nature of the private benefit.54 The court stated: 
[F]acilities of the kind contemplated are a necessary adjunct to the 
successful operation of the main enterprise, namely the marina. 
This being true, it follows that such business is at least in that re-
spect incidental to the operation of the marina. It is not the princi-
pal purpose of the undertaking.55 
 The “main enterprise” of the project, the marina, was not to be put 
to any private use. Had the marina been constructed and put to sub-
stantial use by a private entity, the court may well have affirmed the 
trial court’s refusal to validate the bonds.56 This, however, was not 
the case. The Panama City court never spoke directly to the issue of 
whether tax revenues may be used to secure revenue bonds where a 
private entity substantially benefited from the main project funded 
by the bonds. 
 As the above discussion illustrates, none of the cases cited by the 
Florida Supreme Court in Poe directly address the issue of whether 
article VII, section 10 requires that a bond be repaid solely from 
revenues derived from the financed project. The fact of the matter is 
that the Florida Constitution states that “revenue bonds are payable 
                                                                                                                    
 51. Panama City v. State, 93 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1957). 
 52. Id. at 612. 
 53. Id. at 611. 
 54. See id. at 610 (“[S]aid bonds, both principal and interest, shall be retired solely 
and exclusively from funds derived from the net revenues of the revenue producing facili-
ties of the project and from the proceeds of excise taxes . . . and from license taxes and 
franchise taxes.”). 
 55. Id. at 614. 
 56. See State v. Jacksonville Port Auth., 204 So. 2d 881, 884-85 (Fla. 1967). Citing to 
Panama City, the court reversed a decree validating bonds for the purpose of constructing 
port facilities which were to be leased to a private entity and held that “the only public 
purpose to be served by this project is the promotion of the Port and the general welfare of 
the area served by increasing payrolls, providing employment, etc., which this Court has 
said is not a public purpose as contemplated by our decisions and the Constitution.” Id. 
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solely from revenue derived from the sale, operation or leasing of the 
projects.”57 Over time, the Florida courts have judicially written this 
requirement out of the constitution rather than allowing the citizens 
of Florida the opportunity to decide the issue by vote as provided by 
Article XI, Section 5 of the Florida Constitution.58  
C.   The Bounds of Paramount Public Purpose 
 The dictionary defines “paramount” as an adjective describing 
something that is “chief in importance.”59 In the context of a bond is-
sue, the public purpose is to be measured relative to any other pur-
poses that the contemplated project might have.60 This, however, falls 
well short of establishing a bright line test for determining whether a 
bond issue is valid. 
 Clearly, as in the case of Poe, a bond issue may provide enormous 
benefits to a private entity and still be deemed to serve a paramount 
public purpose. The problem that exists is that trying to compare the 
benefits to the public with the benefits to the private entity is like 
trying to compare apples with oranges. The benefits to the commu-
nity are speculative whereas the benefits to the private entity can be 
clearly measured. The owner of the Buccaneers gained a new sta-
dium and, consequently, new sources of revenue without any risk to 
his own capital. The local government on the other hand must rely on 
the continued popularity of the sport, the continued viability of the 
team, and the projected positive impact on the local economy, none of 
which come with any guarantees. Consequently, the paramount pur-
pose of the project may vary depending on whether one looks at it 
from the perspective of the owner or that of the community. To the 
owner, the “chief importance” of the project is increased revenue for 
the team; for the community, the “chief importance” is economic 
growth. 
 So, the question becomes whether the determination of para-
mount public purpose rests solely on whether the public receives a 
larger benefit than the private entity. The answer is not clear from a 
reading of Poe and the cases that have followed.61 Recently, in State 
v. JEA, the supreme court reaffirmed the position that “an incidental 
                                                                                                                    
 57. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 10(c). 
 58. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5(a). 
 59. THE AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY 879 (C.L. Barnhart & Jess Stein eds., Ran-
dom House 1966). 
 60. State v. Panama City Beach, 529 So. 2d 250, 253 (Fla. 1988). 
 61. See, e.g., State v. Osceola County, 752 So. 2d 530, 539 (Fla. 1999): 
[T]he convention center in this case serves a paramount public purpose. As the 
trial court found, the convention center would, among other things, promote 
gainful employment, promote outside business interests and tourism, and pro-
vide a forum for educational, recreational and entertainment activities. Such 
interests have been found to serve a public purpose. 
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private benefit is not sufficient to negate the public character of a 
project.”62 However, the court went further than it did in Poe and 
commented that a bond issue could be invalidated if the benefit to a 
private party represented the paramount purpose of the project.63 
Quoting from Orange County Industrial Development Authority v. 
State, a case not addressed in Poe, the court stated: 
Running throughout this Court’s decisions on paramount public 
purpose is a consistent theme. It is that there is required a para-
mount public purpose with only an incidental private benefit. If 
there is only an incidental benefit to a private party, then the 
bonds will be validated since the private benefits “are not so sub-
stantial as to tarnish the public character” of the project.64  
Thus, it appears that there are limits to the amount of benefits that 
may inure to a private entity from a project financed by local gov-
ernments. But again, determining whether the public character of a 
project has been tarnished by a substantial private benefit is no eas-
ier than finding the line between paramount public purpose and pre-
dominately private purpose as illustrated by the Poe case.  
 In Orange County, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
court’s refusal to validate a bond issue intended to finance the con-
struction of a local television station.65 The supreme court found the 
public purpose of the project was not paramount.66 As in Poe, the pro-
ject to be financed did not fit within the constitutionally-prescribed 
exceptions to the rule barring an arm of the state from lending its 
taxing power or credit for the benefit of a private entity.67 Accord-
ingly, the court looked for a paramount public purpose. The court 
concluded that there would “be no benefit to the public other than the 
improved local news coverage which might produce a more informed 
citizenry in the central Florida area, a minimal increase in employ-
ment, limited economic prosperity to the community, and an alleged 
advancement of the general welfare of the people.”68 Noting that is-
suance of the bonds would save the station owners approximately 
$300,000 per year over the life of the bonds, the court held that a 
“broad, general public purpose” would not overcome the fact that the 
project served a primarily private purpose and affirmed the invalida-
tion of the bonds.69 
                                                                                                                    
 62. 789 So. 2d 268, 272 (Fla. 2001). 
 63. Id. at 273. 
 64. Id. at 272 (quoting Orange County Indus. Dev. Auth. v. State, 427 So. 2d 174, 179 
(Fla. 1983) (emphasis added)). 
 65. Orange County, 427 So. 2d at 179. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 178-79. 
 68. Id. at 179. 
 69. Id. 
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 It is interesting that the Poe court chose not to mention the Or-
ange County case. In a sense, the two cases define the ditches as they 
relate to the constitutionality of bond issues conferring benefits upon 
private entities. One case illustrates a paramount public purpose and 
one does not. The apparent distinction between the two cases, if one 
exists, is the size of the economic benefit that would eventually flow 
to the affected communities relative to the benefit flowing to the pri-
vate entity. In Poe, the local government produced a witness that tes-
tified that keeping the Buccaneers in Tampa could contribute more 
than $400 million to the local economy.70 In Orange County, on the 
other hand, the positive economic impact was perceived by the court 
to be quite minimal.71  
 Looking at these two cases together leads one to the conclusion 
that the bounds of the public purpose doctrine in this context are left 
to the discretion of the courts. As the court stated in Orange County, 
“[e]very new business, manufacturing plant, or industrial plant 
which may be established in a municipality will be of some benefit to 
the municipality.”72 Consequently, the lack of a clear definition of 
“paramount public purpose” imbues the courts with a significant 
amount of policymaking power. Hence, the popular sentiment behind 
attracting or keeping a professional sports franchise may serve to 
make constitutional an otherwise questionable bond issue.73  
III.   AD VALOREM TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR PRIVATE ENDEAVORS 
SERVING A PUBLIC PURPOSE 
 Interestingly, what may be defined under Florida law as a public 
purpose in the bond validation context may not be a public purpose 
in the context of ad valorem tax exemptions.74 Article VII, Section 3 
of the Florida Constitution provides that “[a]ll property owned by a 
municipality and used exclusively by it for municipal or public pur-
poses shall be exempt from taxation.”75 A quick reading would then 
suggest that property determined to serve a public purpose in the 
bond validation context would consequently be exempt from ad 
valorem taxation under the constitution. Prior to 1968, this was gen-
erally the case.76 Under the Florida Constitution of 1885, a leasehold 
held by a private entity was subject to taxation unless it was “used 
exclusively for religious, scientific, municipal, educational, literary or 
                                                                                                                    
 70. Poe v. Hillsborough County, 695 So. 2d 672, 678 (Fla. 1997). 
 71. Orange County, 427 So. 2d at 179. 
 72. Id. (quoting State v. Town of North Miami, 59 So. 2d 779, 784 (Fla. 1952)). 
 73. Poe, 695 So. 2d at 679. 
 74. Sebring Airport Auth. v. McIntyre, 783 So. 2d 238, 241 (Fla. 2001) (Sebring IV). 
 75. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3(a) (emphasis added). 
 76. Sebring IV, 783 So. 2d at 245-46. 
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charitable purposes.”77 Municipal purposes were broadly defined.78 In 
Daytona Beach Racing and Recreational Facilities District v. Paul, 
for example, the court quashed the lower court’s determination that 
the district was subject to ad valorem taxation because the Daytona 
Motor Speedway was “in reality a private venture and not a public 
purpose.”79 Chiding the lower court, the supreme court remarked: 
It would be a matter of great inconsistency, if not bad faith, after 
declaring the Speedway facility a public or municipal purpose in 
the bond validation case in the broadest and most sweeping terms, 
to hold the decision below in the instant case does not conflict with 
the bond validation decision and that the tax exemption granted 
by the Legislature in favor of the lands and facilities utilized in the 
operation of the Speedway is no longer applicable because they 
have somehow lost their recognized attributes as public or munici-
pal purpose lands or facilities.80  
In order to remedy the resultant tax inequities, the law in this regard 
was changed with the adoption of the Florida Constitution of 1968 to 
limit exemptions to situations where the property in question was 
“owned by a municipality and used exclusively by it for municipal or 
public purposes.”81 
 The Florida courts were slow to give full effect to the constitu-
tional changes.82 A clear judicial statement of what made the 1968 
provision different from the 1885 provision was not made until 1975 
in Williams v. Jones.83 Williams announced the “governmental-
governmental” standard for determining whether a property was ex-
empt from ad valorem taxation on the basis of its municipal or public 
use.84 Rejecting a claim by business owners that they were fulfilling a 
public purpose and therefore exempt from ad valorem taxation on 
leaseholds obtained from the Santa Rosa Island Authority, the court 
stated: 
The operation of the commercial establishments represented by 
appellants’ cases is purely proprietary and for profit. They are not 
governmental functions. If such a commercial establishment oper-
ated for profit on Panama City Beach, Miami Beach, Daytona 
Beach, or St. Petersburg Beach is not exempt from tax, then why 
should such an establishment operated for profit on Santa Rosa Is-
                                                                                                                    
 77. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. XVI, § 16 (emphasis added). 
 78. Sebring IV, 783 So. 2d at 245-46. 
 79. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist. v. Paul, 179 So. 2d 349, 352 
(Fla. 1965). 
 80. Id. at 353. 
 81. Sebring IV, 783 So. 2d at 245; see also FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3(a). 
 82. Sebring IV, 783 So. 2d at 246.  
 83. Id. (citing Williams v. Jones, 326 So.2d 425 (Fla. 1975)). 
 84. Williams, 326 So. 2d at 433. 
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land Beach be exempt?85 
The law has since evolved to the point where a private entity’s use of 
property owned by a governmental unit may be classified in one of 
three categories: (1) private, (2) governmental-proprietary, or (3) gov-
ernmental-governmental.86 Of the three uses, only governmental-
governmental may exempt a property from ad valorem taxation, 
unless of course the predominant use falls into one of the constitu-
tionally defined exceptions: educational, literary, scientific, religious, 
or charitable.87 The distinction between a governmental-proprietary 
and a governmental-governmental function rests primarily on 
whether the function is one traditionally performed by a governmen-
tal unit.88 Proprietary functions are typically for-profit activities 
which also “promote the comfort, convenience, safety and happiness 
of citizens, whereas government functions concern the administra-
tion of some phase of government.”89 
A.   Confusing Bond Validation Public Purpose with Ad Valorem 
Public Purpose 
 In Sebring Airport Authority v. McIntyre (Sebring IV), the Florida 
Supreme Court lamented the use of the phrase “public purpose” in 
the context of both bond validation and ad valorem taxation.90 Paren-
thetically, the court noted that: 
[T]he time may be ripe to adopt a new phraseology for use in bond 
validation cases—such as “in the public interest” and “in the 
paramount public interest”—to avoid confusion between an article 
VII, section 10 analysis in bond validation cases, and an article 
VII, section 3(a) analysis in tax exemption cases.91 
This may or may not be true. A strong argument exists that the time 
may be ripe to conclude that paramount public purpose has no place 
in the constitutional analysis of bond validation cases under article 
VII, section 10. The appellants’ argument in Sebring IV illustrates 
the problems that will continue to arise under the nebulous doctrine 
of public purpose that exists today. 
                                                                                                                    
 85. Id. 
 86. See Sebring IV, 783 So. 2d at 242. 
 87. See id. at 252. “Legislatively deeming a governmental-proprietary purpose to be a 
‘governmental-governmental’ purpose does not change its true nature and does not result 
in the constitutional awarding of a tax exemption where, absent the legislation, there 
clearly could be no exemption.” Id. (quoting David M. Hudson, Governmental Immunity 
and Taxation in Florida, 9 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 221, 250 (1998)). 
 88. Id. at 242. 
 89. Id. at 242 n.2 (quoting Sebring Airport Auth. v. McIntyre, 642 So. 2d 1072, 1074 
n.1 (1994) (Sebring II)) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1219 (6th ed. 1990)). 
 90. Id. at 250-51. 
 91. Id. at 253 n.19 (emphasis omitted). 
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 The court in Sebring IV upheld the lower court’s determination 
that a portion of section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes, amended in 
1994, was unconstitutional.92 The amended statute defined activities 
previously held to be governmental-proprietary functions, such as 
the operation of convention centers and stadiums, as “serving ‘a gov-
ernmental, municipal, or public purpose or function’” and were there-
fore exempt from ad valorem taxation.93 The supreme court agreed 
with the lower court in that “the legislature’s redefinition of the term 
. . . must fail because the redefined term conflicts with the ‘normal 
and ordinary meaning’ of the phrase ‘governmental, municipal or 
public purpose or function.’”94 
 The appellants in Sebring IV sought an ad valorem tax exemption 
for a leasehold obtained from the Sebring Airport Authority for the 
purposes of auto racing and related commercial activities.95 The ap-
pellants had failed once before in Sebring II to obtain an exemption 
under the previous incarnation of section 196.012(6) that provided an 
exemption only when the lessee “is demonstrated to perform a func-
tion or serve a governmental purpose which could properly be per-
formed or served by an appropriate governmental unit or which is 
demonstrated to perform a function or serve a purpose which would 
otherwise be a valid subject for the allocation of public funds.”96 The 
main thrust of the court’s brief ruling in Sebring II was that operat-
ing a racetrack was clearly a governmental-proprietary function and 
did not fit within the old section 196.012(6)’s definition of a public 
purpose.97 The appellants’ reliance on Poe v. Hillsborough County in 
arguing the constitutionality of the amended section 196.012(6) made 
the court’s job much more difficult in Sebring IV.98  
 In Sebring IV, the appellants argued that section 196.012’s 
amended statutory definition of activities mirrored the types of ac-
tivities consistently found to serve a public purpose in bond valida-
tion cases.99 Taking their cue from Poe, the appellants insisted that 
the court should recognize that the constitution is a “fluid document” 
and defer to reasonable legislative definitions of public purpose 
which reflect modern attitudes and common usage.100 The court 
would have none of it. It answered that the language of the constitu-
tion, not common usage, was “the touchstone against which the Leg-
                                                                                                                    
 92. Id. at 253. 
 93. Id. at 240. 
 94. Id. at 252 (quoting Sebring Airport Auth. v. McIntyre, 718 So. 2d 296, 298 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 1998)). 
 95. Id. at 241. 
 96. Sebring II, 642 So. 2d 1072, 1073 (Fla. 1994). 
 97. Id. at 1073-74. 
 98. Sebring IV, 783 So. 2d at 248-49. 
 99. Id. at 241. 
 100. Id. at 243. 
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islature’s enactments are to be judicially measured,” and to hold oth-
erwise would result in the “tail wagging the dog.”101 These comments 
stand in stark contrast to the validation of revenue bonds context 
where public purpose has no set definition and is only limited to the 
extent that private benefits are “not so substantial as to tarnish the 
public character” of the financed project.102 
 The Sebring IV court explained, however, that bond validation 
cases are not analogous to ad valorem exemption cases.103 It cited two 
primary distinctions. First, two different constitutional provisions 
are implicated: article VII, section 10 in the bond validation context; 
and article VII, section 3 in the exemption cases.104 Second, the issu-
ance of revenue bonds and the provision of ad valorem tax exemp-
tions have distinct fiscal implications.105 However, the soundness of 
these distinctions is open to debate.  
 Regarding the constitutional distinction, the Sebring IV court 
noted that the “‘public purpose’ analysis is constitutionally derived in 
the tax exemption context; however, as applied to the bond validation 
context, in contrast, the phrase ‘public purpose’ does not appear in 
the governing constitutional provision.”106 This statement is prob-
lematic. “Public purpose” is a general concept. Yet, when used in ar-
ticle VII, section 3(a), the court allows very little room for legislative 
discretion in determining what constitutes a public purpose; a public 
purpose must involve the “administration of some phase of govern-
ment.”107 On the other hand, when judicially inserted into article VII, 
section 10, public purpose authorizes the issuance of revenue bonds 
for projects of every size and scope not withstanding the fact that the 
plain language of article VII, section 10 addresses only airports, 
ports, manufacturing facilities, and industrial facilities.108 Without 
addressing the apparently backward construction of these provisions, 
the court in Sebring IV simply concluded that “public purpose” meant 
two different things in the different contexts and that it was “per-
haps both confusing and unfortunate, then, that the same term—
‘public purpose’—has traditionally been used in both of these analyti-
cal contexts.”109 Removal of “public purpose” from the bond validation 
analysis would go a long way toward resolving this confusion.  
                                                                                                                    
 101. Id. at 244.  
 102. State v. JEA, 789 So. 2d 268, 272 (Fla. 2001) (citations omitted). 
 103. Sebring IV, 783 So. 2d at 250. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 250-51 n.15. 
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247 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1971). 
 109. Sebring IV, 783 So. 2d at 250-51. 
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 The second distinction offered by the court in Sebring IV, fiscal 
impact, does not compel the conclusion that a private entity should 
be allowed to benefit substantially in the bond validation context but 
not in the ad valorem exemption context. The court emphasized fair-
ness in allocating the property tax burden among all properties put 
to private use.110 The court remarked that “in bond validation cases, a 
shift in the ad valorem tax burden to other taxpayers is not antici-
pated. In tax exemption cases, in contrast, any newly-created tax ex-
emption necessarily involves a direct shift in tax burden from the ex-
empt property to other nonexempt properties.”111  
 One cannot quarrel with the argument that all property put to 
private use should bear its fair share of the property tax burden. 
However, it is difficult to see how encouraging development and eco-
nomic growth through ad valorem tax exemptions is less fair to the 
public than taxing it to repay revenue bonds supporting projects sub-
stantially benefiting private entities. In either case, the overall tax 
burden on the public increases and the capital position of the private 
entity improves. 
 Thus, the Sebring IV court concluded that the Florida Constitu-
tion required two distinct analyses in the context of bond validation 
cases and ad valorem taxation cases.112 However, it closed its opinion 
with comments that, with some editing, would be particularly appro-
priate should it decide to rethink the public purpose doctrine as ap-
plied in bond validation cases: 
We certainly understand that there is enormous competition to se-
cure professional athletic teams and other forms of entertainment 
and economic development which benefit Florida citizens. We also 
recognize the tremendous economic forces and implications that 
become involved in this type of issue and the good faith legislative 
attempts to balance these concerns. However, as long as the people 
of Florida maintain the constitution in the form we are required to 
apply today, neither we nor the Legislature may expand the permis-
sible exemptions based on this type of argument. The people of Flor-
ida have spoken in the organic law and we honor that voice. It is 
not for this Court or the Legislature to grant ad valorem taxation 
exemptions not provided for in the present constitutional provi-
sions . . . .113 
                                                                                                                    
 110. Id. at 247 (“It is fundamentally unfair for the Legislature to statutorily manipu-
late assessment standards and criteria to favor certain taxpayers over others.”) (quoting 
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IV.   EMINENT DOMAIN AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE REQUIREMENT 
 A third variation of the “public purpose” standard appears in the 
context of eminent domain proceedings. Article X, Section 6 of the 
Florida Constitution provides that “[n]o private property shall be 
taken except for a public purpose and with full compensation there-
for paid.”114 To a lesser extent than in bond validation and ad 
valorem tax exemption cases, what constitutes a “public purpose” in 
the eminent domain context is not always clear.115  
 However, the courts have made two things clear. Public purpose is 
not synonymous with public use, and the validity of a public purpose 
is one for judicial determination.116 The Florida Supreme Court has 
held that the “term ‘public purpose’ does not mean simply that the 
land is used for a specific public function, i.e. a road or other right of 
way. Rather, the concept of public purpose must be read more 
broadly to include projects which benefit the state in a tangible, fore-
seeable way.”117 For example, the state may condemn more property 
than is necessary to accommodate a contemplated project, in order to 
avoid the payment of statutorily mandated business damages, when 
doing so would result in decreased acquisition costs.118 Whether the 
state has any plans for the unused portion of the property is irrele-
vant.119 
 Hence a valid “public purpose” does not necessarily entail putting 
the condemned property to public use. However, the concept is lim-
ited in that “eminent domain cannot be employed to take private 
property for a predominantly private use.”120 In this context, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court has held:  
The standard for determining the question of “public purpose” is 
the same under article VII, section 10 and article X, section 6. If a 
project serves a public purpose sufficient to allow the expenditure 
of public funds and the sale of bonds under article VII, section 10, 
then the use of eminent domain in furtherance of the project is also 
proper.121 
 Unlike bond validation cases, however, the analysis does not end 
with a court’s finding of public purpose. The condemning authority 
has the burden of showing that the taking is reasonably, but not ab-
                                                                                                                    
 114. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a) (emphasis added). 
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solutely, necessary to serve the public purpose.122 Even then, the 
landowner may prevail by showing that the authority acted in bad 
faith or abused its discretion.123  
A.   Reasonable Necessity and the Requirement of Good Faith 
 The judicial review of the necessity to condemn property is justi-
fied in order to guard against the “tunnel vision” of administrative 
agencies tending to obscure alternative, less burdensome, courses of 
action.124 Nevertheless, the condemning authority’s quantum of proof 
in showing necessity is a modest one.125 It must produce some evi-
dence that the taking was necessary.126 This is accomplished by 
showing that the condemning authority reached its decision only af-
ter considering “relevant factors, such as alternative sites, costs, 
long-range area planning, environmental and safety considera-
tions.”127 Upon such a showing, the burden shifts to the landowner to 
show that the condemnor acted in bad faith or abused its discretion 
in some way.128 However, good faith on the part of the condemning 
authority does not require it to investigate every possible alternative 
suggested by affected landowners.129  
 In showing reasonable necessity, the condemning authority is not 
required to present evidence pinpointing the need for the condemned 
property.130 In City of Jacksonville v. Griffin, the Florida Supreme 
Court relaxed the burden placed on a condemning authority.131 A 
previous ruling by the court held that a condemning authority could 
not obtain an order of taking without presenting evidence pinpoint-
ing its need for the property.132 The Griffin court receded from that 
position and found that it was not necessary for a condemning au-
thority to have fully developed its plans for the condemned property 
before instituting eminent domain proceedings.133 In doing so, Griffin 
solved the problem of the “Why not my neighbor?” argument.134 That 
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548  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:529 
 
argument asserted that the fact that the condemning authority had 
no immediate plans for similarly situated properties in the area 
demonstrated an abuse of discretion.135 The court wisely concluded 
that a condemning authority “must start somewhere” and that to 
hold otherwise would frustrate large redevelopment projects in that 
each affected landowner would be free to challenge the sequence of 
the condemnation proceedings.136 
B.   Takings for Private Use 
 As in the bond validation and the ad valorem tax exemption cases, 
a literal interpretation of the pertinent constitutional provision fails 
to tell the whole story. Article X, Section 6 of the Florida Constitution 
states that “[n]o private property shall be taken except for a public 
purpose.”137 The layperson would likely believe that land taken from 
her would be put to some sort of public use, for example a road, park, 
or government building. However, as noted above, “public purpose” 
has not been held to be synonymous with “public use.”138 Rather, as 
long as the taking fulfills a proper public purpose, the ultimate dis-
position of the property into private hands does not destroy the valid-
ity of the taking.139 Under this rationale, development agreements 
between private developers and municipalities have flourished. Cit-
ing statutory definitions of blight elimination as the overarching pub-
lic purpose, municipalities exercise their statutory eminent domain 
powers to condemn private property and subsequently convey it to 
the private developers in furtherance of redevelopment plans.140 For-
tunately, some degree of protection is afforded to landowners in the 
requirement to show the necessity of the taking in eliminating the 
perceived blight.  
 In one such case, Rukab v. City of Jacksonville Beach, the appel-
late court reversed an order of taking and remanded for further pro-
ceedings requiring the city to demonstrate “public purpose and ne-
cessity.”141 Under Florida’s Community Redevelopment Act, local re-
development agencies are empowered to exercise eminent domain to 
acquire blighted properties.142 The appellants had purchased land in 
an area previously designated as blighted with the intention of re-
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zoning the property and developing it.143 The city denied the appel-
lant’s rezoning request and instituted eminent domain proceedings 
pursuant to a redevelopment agreement reached with a private de-
veloper.144 
 The trial court determined that the only issue to be resolved was 
that of just compensation. It refused to review the blighted status of 
the area because that status had recently been affirmed in another 
eminent domain case and the court took judicial notice thereof.145 The 
appellants argued that they were entitled to de novo review of that 
status and that the city must demonstrate public purpose and neces-
sity as it related to their property.146  
 The appellate court agreed with the appellants. It found that no 
judicial doctrine or precedent worked to bind the appellants to the 
determinations of public use and necessity in a case to which they 
were not parties.147 The Community Redevelopment Act did not pro-
vide a procedure for challenging the designation of the area as 
blighted. As such, the appellants’ first opportunity to challenge the 
blight status arose in the eminent domain proceedings.148 The appel-
late court concluded that “even if there were other opportunities for 
challenging the designation, a property owner must still be afforded 
the opportunity for a full hearing in the eminent domain action. Dur-
ing this action, the City must meet the burden of showing public 
purpose and necessity.”149  
C.   Taking More Than is Necessary 
 The exercise of eminent domain is justified by the “public nature 
of the need and necessity involved.”150 However, this need and neces-
sity also serves to limit the scope of a taking in any given case. While 
a condemning authority is not required to have developed immediate 
plans from the property sought to be taken, the amount of property 
taken must not exceed that which is necessary to meet the demon-
strated need.151  
 In the seminal case of Canal Authority v. Miller, the Florida Su-
preme Court held that the Canal Authority had failed to show the 
necessity of a fee simple taking versus the broad easement which it 
had already gained for the construction of the ill-fated Cross-Florida 
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Barge Canal.152 The trial court and lower appellate court agreed that 
the authority, in seeking a supplemental order for a fee simple tak-
ing, had simply restated the justifications it had relied upon in ob-
taining the easement order.153 Much of the testimony in the trial 
court revolved around a letter from the Army Corps of Engineers, to 
the authority, stating that obtaining fee simple title was necessary 
for the construction of the canal.154 However, the trial court struck 
the testimony of a key witness when the Army refused to disclose a 
file from which the witness had based his conclusion that obtaining 
fee simple title was necessary.155 Summarizing basic tenets of emi-
nent domain law, the Florida Supreme Court stated: 
It is agreed that unless a condemning authority acts illegally, in 
bad faith, or abuses its discretion, its selection of land for condem-
nation will not be overruled by a court; a court is not authorized to 
substitute its judgment for that of a governmental body acting 
within the scope of its lawful authority. This includes both the 
amount and the location of land to be condemned. It is equally well 
recognized, however, that an acquiring authority will not be per-
mitted to take a greater quantity of property, or greater interest or 
estate therein, than is necessary to serve the particular public use 
for which the property is being acquired. 
 In order to insure the property rights of the citizens of the state 
against abuse of the condemning authority’s power it is imperative 
that the necessity for the exercise of the eminent domain power be 
ascertained and established. This is ultimately a judicial question 
to be decided in a court of competent jurisdiction.156 
While Canal Authority and Griffin are seemingly at odds with one 
another, the Griffin court emphasized that the two cases were in fact 
in harmony.157 Each case demands a reasonable showing of necessity 
on the part of the condemning authority.158 The Canal Authority 
failed to show the development of any greater need beyond that 
which justified the order granting the original easement.159 Thus, the 
quantity of property or the extent of a property interest taken for an 
ostensibly public purpose is limited by the ability of the condemning 
                                                                                                                    
 152. Id. at 135. The canal was intended to provide a quick route between the Atlantic 
Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico. Work began in 1963 and was abandoned in 1973 largely be-
cause of environmental concerns. Roger Bull, Failed Barge Canal Project Leads to Cross 
Florida Greenway, FLA. TIMES-UNION (Jacksonville), Jan. 19, 2001, at E3, available at 
http://www.jacksonville.com/tu-online/stories/011901/ent_barge.html (last visited Jan. 25, 
2003) (on file with author). 
 153. Canal Auth., 243 So. 2d at 135. 
 154. Id. at 133. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. (citations omitted). 
 157. City of Jacksonville v. Griffin, 346 So. 2d 988, 990 (Fla. 1977). 
 158. Id.  
 159. Id. 
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authority to show a reasonable necessity for the taking.  
V.   CONCLUSION 
 Clearly, the meaning of “public purpose” has become elusive. The 
problems with capturing its meaning are not unique to Florida. 
Every jurisdiction in the country has undoubtedly wrestled with the 
issue in its efforts to promote the welfare and prosperity of its respec-
tive state.160 Clearly, an element of competition exists in trying to at-
tract professional sports franchises and industry to a state. Commu-
nities undoubtedly sense that their targets will follow the money to 
localities offering the greatest financial incentives. This is a legiti-
mate concern. However, popular sentiment and political motives are 
not the proper forces to apply to the shaping of law rooted in the 
state’s constitution. Perhaps this explains why the application of 
“public purpose” in the eminent domain context seems to generate 
the least debate within this state’s case law.161 As stated by the court 
in Sebring IV: “[A]s long as the people of Florida maintain the consti-
tution in the form we are required to apply . . . , neither [the courts] 
nor the Legislature may expand [upon or contract its provisions]. The 
people of Florida have spoken in the organic law and we must honor 
that voice.”162 
 
                                                                                                                    
 160. See 56 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdi-
visions § 178 (2000) (“A public purpose or use changes with the changing conditions of soci-
ety. The modern trend is to expand and liberally construe the term ‘public use’ in consider-
ing state and municipal activities sought to be brought within its meaning.”). 
 161. Fortune, decided in 1988, represents the most recent serious discussion and 
analysis of public purpose by the supreme court in the eminent domain context. Dep’t of 
Transp. v. Fortune Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 532 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1988). 
 162. Sebring Airport Auth. v. McIntyre (Sebring IV), 783 So. 2d 238, 253 (Fla. 2001). 
